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Adam Smith, Tom Paine, John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx were all bold and outspoken 
about the injustices of extreme inequality, nationally and internationally. Yet by almost 
every standard, global inequality has grown substantially since they were writing, and 
national income inequality also over the last two or three decades. There is a case today 
for more outspokenness about the extremes of inequality, both about the causes and how 
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1 Introduction 
The magnitude of the increases in global inequality over the last two centuries are 
astounding, measured by both the absolute and the relative gaps between the richest and 
the poorest countries, and between the richest and the poorest groups of people.1 
Notwithstanding improvements in some indicators of global inequality in the last two 
decades due to the impressive expansion of China and India, the main indicators of 
global income inequality in recent years are all very high—and much higher than they 
appeared one or two hundred years ago. The trends can be seen in the estimates of the 
rise in Gini coefficients between 1820 and the 1990s, and of the increases in the gaps in 
per capita income between the highest 5 per cent and lowest 20 per cent of world 
population, shown in Tables 1 and 2.  
Table 1: Global inequality 
 1820  1850 1870 1890 1910 1929 1950 1960  1970  1980 1992
World Gini  0.5 0.532 0.56 0.588 0.61 0.616 0.64 0.635 0.65  0.657 0.657
World top 5% to bottom 20%  7  7 9 10 12 12 15 14  16  18 16
Source: Bourguignon and Morrison (2002: table 1). 
 
Statistics on the trend in inequality within countries, shown in Table 2, reveal a more 
diverse picture. In the UK since the early nineteenth century, the ratio of the income 
shares of the richest and poorest steadily fell until about 1970, then remained level 
before rising sharply during 1977-89, with inequality rising more and faster than in any 
other OECD country.2 In the USA, inequality rose in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and declined over the twentieth, until the 1970s when they started increasing 
again. In the Scandinavian  countries, inequality also rose somewhat over the last half of 
the nineteenth century and declined gradually but steadily during the twentieth—and 
have almost always been less than in the UK or the USA.  
 
Inequality within developing countries over the long run is more difficult to judge, 
because of the severe scarcity and inadequacies of data for the nineteenth and the first 
half of the twentieth century. But after the Second World War, the ration of the shares 
between the richest and poorest groups are thought to have declined somewhat in China 
and India until about 1980 and increased after this, not only in China and India but also 
in many other developing countries. Inequality within Latin American countries was 
                                                 
1 As much emphasized recently, the relative gaps between the richest countries and China and India and a 
few other countries have narrowed in the last two decades or so, though inequality has grown within these 
and most other countries.  
2 See, for instance, Atkinson (1999).   2
already among the highest in the world and appears to have been rising in the last few 
decades. Although inequality in Africa (South Africa excepted) is generally not so 
extreme as in Latin America, the levels in many countries are high and also appear to be 
rising. But for sheer speed of increase, the rise in inequality in the countries in transition 
holds the record, following the collapse of the socialist model toward the end of the 
twentieth century.  
Table 2: Inequality within countries and global inequality, 1820-1992, ratios of income 
of top 5% to bottom 10% within selected countries 
  1820 1850 1870 1890 1910 1929 1950 1960 1970 1980 1992
USA  13 13 18 25 25 20 13 13 12 12 15
UK,  Ireland  40 40 35 30 30 16 10 10 7  7 10
Scandinavian countries  13  13  17 17 17 12 9 9 8  8  8
Argentina,  Chile  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 22 23
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya 6  6  6 6 6 8 16 16 15  16  16
Egypt  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 15
China  14 14 14 14 14 13 9 8 8 10 12
India 12  12  12 12 12 12 10 10 10  9  8
Japan 12  12  12 12 12 14 6 6 6  6  6
Brazil  21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 24 24 24
Source: Bourguignon and Morrison (2002).  
 
In considering these statistical trends over the last two centuries we need to bear in mind 
an important point made by Champernowne and Cowell (1998: 49). They warn against 
contemporary investigations that span very dissimilar cultures and which take in what 
has happened over very long periods. We cannot interpret quantitative comparisons of 
inequality across widely separated time periods or within a remote era without careful 
reference to the underlying social order then ruling. In short, as they summarize, 
‘Comparing communities in terms of inequality should not be performed in a vacuum; 
the study of the income distribution and related issues cannot ultimately be divorced 
from the historical development of the social and economic system.’ 
2  Early views on inequality 
What did some of the early giants of political economy and political say about the issues 
of inequality, national and international? In contrast to today’s often bloodless statistical 
analysis, where changes in a few decimal points are treated with reverence and as proof, 
the colour and lively description of political economists writing about inequality during 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries shines out, vividly and sharply.  
 
Adam Smith (1976: 232) made some powerful comments about inequality and its 
origins; ‘Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich   3
man there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the 
indigence of the many.’ Smith emphasized the way such inequality led on to the need 
for government to maintain law and order; ‘The affluence of the rich excites the 
indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to 
invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner 
of that valuable property … can sleep at night in security … The acquisition of valuable 
and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil 
government.’ 
 
Smith had an evolutionary view of society and made clear how inequality had evolved 
with property. In the first period of society, the world of hunter-gatherers, there was 
little property, little inequality and seldom any regular administration of justice.3 The 
second period of society was the ‘age of shepherds’ and with this ‘the inequality of 
fortune first begins to take place and introduces among men a degree of authority and 
subordination which could not possibly exist before. It thereby introduces some degree 
of civil government which is indispensably necessary for its own preservation’ (Smith 
1976: 23)  
 
Smith though blunt, was measured. Thomas Paine (1995a: 401) writing two decades 
later, presented his analysis with pre-Marxian vitriol. He also focused on land as the 
source of inequality: 
It is very well known that in England (and the same will be found in 
other countries) the great landed estates, now held in descent, were 
plundered from the quiet inhabitants at the conquest. The possibility did 
not exist of acquiring such estates honestly … That they were not 
acquired by trade, by commerce, by manufactures, by agriculture or by 
any reputable employment is certain. How then were they acquired? 
Blush, aristocracy, to hear your origin, for your progenitors were Thieves 
… When they had committed the robbery, they endeavoured to lose the 
disgrace of it, by sinking their real names under fictitious ones, which 
they called Titles. It is ever the practice of Felons to act in this manner. 
 
By the mid nineteenth century, industrialization had advanced and poverty had 
deepened, especially in the towns in the United Kingdom. But the statistics suggest that 
little had changed in terms of income distribution. The income of the richest five per 
cent was still, on average, some 80 times estimated income per head. By this time, John 
Stuart Mill and Karl Marx had taken up the cudgels. Mill (1865: 260-1), though 
considering the acquisition of individual property through one’s own labour as just, 
wrote damning indictments of the origins of the actual distribution of property in 
Europe at the time:  
                                                 
3 Anthropologists today would probably differ from this view.   4
The social arrangements of modern Europe commenced from a 
distribution of property which was the result, not of a just partition, or 
acquisition by industry, but of conquest and violence: and 
notwithstanding what industry has been doing for many centuries to 
modify the work of force, the system still retains many and large traces 
of its origins. The laws of property have never yet conformed to the 
principles on which the justification of private property rests. They have 
made property of things which never ought to be property, and absolute 
property where only a qualified property ought to exist. They have not 
held the balance fairly between human beings, but have heaped 
impediments upon some, to give advantage to others; they have 
purposely fostered inequalities, and prevented all from starting fair in the 
race. 
 
Mill goes on with analysis of the role of law in this process, which seems to have its 
own parallels today: 
That all should start on perfectly equal terms is inconsistent with any law 
of private property; but if as much pains as has been taken to aggravate 
the inequality of chances arising from the natural workings of the 
principle, had been taken to temper that inequality by every means not 
subversive to the principle itself; if the tendency of legislation had been 
to favour the diffusion, instead of the concentration of wealth, to 
encourage the subdivision of the large masses instead of striving to keep 
them together; the principle of individual property would have been 
found to have no necessary connexion with the physical and social evils 
which almost all Socialist writers assume to be inseparable from it. 
 
A half century later, or at least by the time of the eighth edition of his Principles of 
Economics, Alfred Marshall (1920) had considerably shifted the focus and frame of 
economic analysis. Although Marshall made the Distribution of the National Income the 
title and theme of Book VI, the final part of the Principles, his emphasis was very 
different from that of Mill and Marx. His unifying approach was the new science of 
marginal analysis applied to land and capital, as to other factors of production. 
Institutions of land and property were still there and of central importance, but little 
attention was given to close inquiry into their distant origins.4 Although in appendices 
to the Principles, Marshall (1920: 647) showed himself well aware of the economic 
history of different parts of the world, including the role of war and conquest, he 
permitted himself this comment on the United States: 
                                                 
4 Although Marshall did include an Appendix A, which traced the growth of free industry and enterprise 
‘from savage life to the early forms of civilization’.   5
Of the causes which have contributed to make the English race the chief 
owners of the New World, the most important is that bold enterprise 
which has made a man, who is rich enough to be a peasant proprietor, 
generally refuse to be content with the humdrum life and the narrow 
income of a peasant. 
 
In spite of this paragraph being in a chapter on land tenure, there was no mention of the 
process under which millions of American Indians had been dispossessed of their land. 
 
We need to jump ahead to the time of the United Nations to recover some of the blunt 
and colourful language of the early and mid nineteenth century economists. The 1951 
UN report on Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries 
made much of the need for land reform, and reintroduced some of the early 
outspokenness. The expert committee included two subsequent Nobel Prize-winning 
economists, Arthur Lewis and T.W. Schultz. The report maintained the emphasis on 
how the land was owned and how it was used, not on how it was acquired. But there 
was quite enough to complain of in matters of landlord-peasant relationships: 
In many under-developed countries, the cultivators of the soil are 
exploited mercilessly by a landlord class, which perform no useful social 
function. This class strives to secure itself the major part of any increase 
in agricultural yields, and is thus a millstone around the necks of the 
peasants, discouraging them from making improvements in agriculture 
and, in any case, leaving them too little income from which they might 
save to invest in the land. In such countries, land reform abolishing the 
landlord class is an urgent pre-requisite of agricultural progress. 
(UN 1951: 21) 
 
In its early years, the UN returned to the issues of land reform on many occasions and in 
many reports. But over time, the language became more temperate and the emphasis 
shifted from distribution to the practicalities of raising agricultural productivity.  
 
In the 1970s, income distribution within countries was again brought into focus with the 
ILO’s World Employment Programme. The first of the ILO country missions, led by 
Dudley Seers to Columbia in 1970, made income distribution the centre of its analysis 
(ILO 1970). Within two years, redistribution from growth became the integrating core 
of the ILO mission to Kenya (ILO 1972). This led in 1974 to the joint World Bank-IDS 
study on Redistribution with Growth.5 generalizing strategies for linking growth with 
redistribution and providing case studies of experience in India, Cuba, Tanzania, Sri 
Lanka, South Korea and Taiwan. 
                                                 
5 Chenery et al. (1974). As made clear in the preface, it was Dudley Seers of the IDS who first proposed 
this collaborative effort.   6
It is noteworthy that, until recently, the World Bank did very little on income 
distribution as is brought out in its history, The World Bank: Its First Half Century 
(Kapur et al. 1997). The major exception was during the presidency of Robert 
McNamara between 1968-81, though even this was short-lived. McNamara raised the 
issue of income distribution on a number of occasions in the early 1970s and 
highlighted ‘Latin America’s scandalous income and wealth disparities’ in a major 
speech in Mexico City in 1972. But after this, the emphasis was shifted away from 
equity and towards ‘the absolute poor’ (Chenery et al. 1974: 239). It is therefore 
significant and welcome that the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006 
focused so clearly on income distribution (World Bank 2006).  
3  Early views on international inequality 
Smith is widely seen as the intellectual father of free trade and globalization and 
certainly, he was a major advocate and analyst of the benefits of freer trade. But he was 
also careful to indicate his belief that there were losers as well as gainers in the process. 
For instance, he refers to the discovery of America and that of a passage to the East 
Indies by the Cape of Good Hope as ‘the two greatest and most important events 
recorded in the history of mankind’, and he underlines their enormously positive 
consequences (Smith 1976: 141); ‘By uniting in some measure, the most distant part of 
the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to increase on another’s 
enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry, their general tendency would 
seem to be beneficial.’ But Smith was totally alert to the fact that not all would benefit 
and he continues, ‘To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the 
commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost 
in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned.’  Smith was careful in 
analysing how the worst of the misfortunes reflected the imbalances of power of the 
time, adding ‘At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority 
of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans that they were enabled to 
commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries.’ 
 
Smith looked to the future, in words which should perhaps encourage broader 
perspectives among today’s supporters of free trade; ‘However, perhaps, the natives of 
these countries may grow stronger, or those of the Europe may grow weaker, and the 
inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of 
courage and force which, inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of 
independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another.’ And for 
good measure he adds, ‘But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force 
than that mutual communications of knowledge and of all sorts of improvements which 
an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather 
necessarily, carries along with it.’ (Smith 1976: 142). 
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Over the years of the UN, the importance accorded to global inequality has fluctuated, 
with periods when it has been seen as an important international issue followed by 
periods when it has been virtually ignored. Even in its first few years, the UN’s own 
work on national income raised concerns about income distribution within and between 
countries. In 1951 in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), for instance, the 
Indian delegate noted that ‘the average annual per capita income of North America was 
$1,100, of Oceania $560, of Europe $380, of USSR $310, of South America $170, of 
Africa $75, and of Asia only $50. Thus, it appeared that the 65 per cent of the world’s 
population which lived in Africa, Asia and Latin America received only about 15 per 
cent of the world’s income.’6  
 
This stirred some surprising reactions. The delegate of the USSR made a strong attack 
on internal income distribution within the United States. More surprising, this was 
followed by the American delegate making supportive comments about the need to 
tackle global inequalities: 
Everyone would agree … that it was desirable to reduce and in due 
course to eliminate the existence of such large discrepancies … that 
national and international action must be taken to secure a greater 
equality in living standards in the world. It was believed in the United 
States that the existing disparities in national income must be reduced by 
an expansion of the world’s total income, an increasing share of that 
expanding income going to underdeveloped areas. The problem must be 
viewed dynamically in terms of increasing the world’s volume of goods 
and services and in raising general well-being.7 
 
The Brazilian delegate put the point with fewer qualifications: ‘The problems was not to 
restore the old balance, but rather to create a new equilibrium by which the disparities of 
income and wealth throughout the world would be eliminated …’.8 When ten years 
later, the First Development Decade was under preparation, the Proposals for Action 
prepared by the Secretariat had this to say: 
It is true that the GA resolution lays down a precise quantitative target 
for the increase in aggregate incomes, and there is no similar quantitative 
target for changes in income distribution. We can, however, take it for 
granted that the 5 per cent growth target established by the resolution 
also implies that the increment in incomes thus achieved should be 
wisely used for the benefit of poorer sections of the population and 
should result in a degree of social progress which is at least in balance 
                                                 
6 ECOSOC, 514
th meeting, 22 August 1951, para 56, page 320. 
7 ECOSOC 516
th meeting, 23 August 1951, paragraphs 60, 61. 
8 ECOSOC, 247
th meeting, 18 March, 1949.   8
with the rise in aggregate national income. Normally, this would mean 
that the rise in aggregate income must be associated with an income 
distribution more equal, or at least not more unequal, than that at present. 
(UN 1962: 9) 
 
In 1969, the Pearson Commission issued its report, Partners in Development, the first 
sentence of which emphasised the importance of global income distribution: ‘The 
widening gap between the developed and the developing countries has become a central 
issue of our times’ (Pearson 1969). 
 
Concerns with global income distribution became more sharply focused in the 1970s 
with the North-South debate on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Issues 
of global income distribution had been brought into sharp relief by the massive 
increases in oil prices, which had shifted the equivalent of about 2 per cent of global 
income in favour of the oil producing countries, with about three-quarters of this 
coming from developed countries and the remainder from developing countries. 
Fundamental questions were therefore raised about the links between international 
trade, economic relationships and global inequality, together with hopes that further 
changes might be possible. But such hopes were short-lived. Debate on the NIEO met 
with strong opposition from the industrial countries and was effectively terminated by 
the end of the 1970s. Rising debt and imbalances in budgets and foreign exchange in 
developing countries ushered in the era of stabilization and structural adjustment.  
 
It took until 1988 before the UN General Assembly again came out strongly on global 
inequality: 
Mindful that the existing inequalities and imbalances between the 
international economic system are widening the gap between developed 
and developing countries and thereby constitute of major obstacle to the 
development of the developing countries and adversely international 
relations and the promotion of world peace and security.9 
 
Though in the 1990s, UNDP’s Human Development Reports frequently drew attention 
to global inequality, the dominant international focus in recent years has been on 
poverty and the Millennium Development Goals. Though this has certainly been a move 
in the right direction and a big improvement on economic growth as the central 
preoccupation for development, it is still far from sufficient. The Millennium 
Declaration itself made little reference to global inequality. Cornia (2004: 3) has 
summarized the positive and the negatives of recent developments:  
                                                 
9 United Nations, General Assembly GA/RES/43/156, 8 December 1988.   9
The last decade has witnessed a blossoming of research on poverty-
related topics as well as a surge in attention towards the issue of poverty 
reduction by governments, the international financial institutions, the 
United Nations and social scientists … [but he adds] A similar shift in 
focus and policy stance has yet to take place in the case of income 
inequality. While research in the field has made considerable strides, the 
policy reforms inspired by the Washington consensus have broadly 
ignored the issues of high and rising inequality, of its impact on poverty 
and growth, and of the measures required to contain it. 
4  Conclusions and recommendations 
Some of the greatest economists and philosophers of two centuries ago were bold and 
outspoken about the injustices of extreme inequality, nationally and internationally. 
Their words stand in sharp contrast to the more measured descriptions of analysts today. 
Yet by almost every standard, global inequality has grown substantially since that 
period, just as national inequality has grown in most countries over the last two to three 
decades. There is a case today for more outspokenness. There is also a case for more 
outspokenness about the causes of inequality, and how these causes are linked to some 
of the extreme injustices of the past. Moreover, some of the inequality are maintained 
by laws of property and economic relationships which do not readily allow for 
investigations into the distant origins of these inequality. Several examples come to mind: 
•  Inequalities of land holdings, mine or forest resources, where original ownership 
derived from colonial times. It is conventional among politicians of developed 
countries to say that the colonial era is past and no longer of relevance. Often 
national constitutions, put in place at the time of independence, prevent reopening 
issues of land ownership or only allow this if there is to be full compensation. 
Economists should be willing to remind such persons that the ownership of 
inherited property, and the continuing benefits of having had such property, often 
serve as a link with these injustices of the colonial past.  
•  Inequalities related to theft or the unjust allocation of new rights influenced by 
political connections. A particular source of current injustice relates to the 
acquisition of mining royalties through support for a new government seizing 
power through a coup or using other undemocratic means with foreign support, as 
with the recent attempt in Equatorial Guinea. 
•  The operation of legal systems and international law in the context of great 
inequality of wealth and disparities of power and political influence act as a force 
for sustaining and sometimes for increasing inequality. Again there are many 
examples but those in the area of intellectual property and trade are especially 
important for developing countries.  
   10
For encouragement to think more courageously about international income 
redistribution, one can end by referring to the remarkable and bold proposal of Paine 
(1995b: 409-33) put forward in his pioneering pamphlet on Agrarian Justice in 1795-6. 
Paine began this proposal by commentating on the state of ‘civilization’, using language 
that if replaced with the word globalization could easily be applied today. He wrote that 
the inequality of the time were such that ‘on the one side the spectator is dazzled by 
splendid appearances; on the other, he is shocked by extremes of wretchedness.’  
 
This led to Paine’s remarkable proposal for income redistribution published more than 
two centuries ago. He proposed a plan for ameliorating the situation of young and older 
persons by the creation in every nation of a national fund. This would be used to pay 
every young man and young woman at age twenty-one a sum of fifteen pounds sterling 
to enable that person to make a start in the world. Persons reaching the age of fifty 
would receive an annual pension of ten pounds. In both cases the logic was that in 
earlier times both groups would have had access to land to provide initial employment 
or security for their later years, but with the enclosure movement and dispossession of 
half the population from the land this was no longer available.  
 
Paine’s proposal for funding this scheme was equally remarkable. He proposed that an 
inheritance tax should be set at the level of 10 per cent of the value of all landed 
property and that this should be charged on the death of the owner, at the time the 
property passed to the next generation. Paine calculated that the revenue generated by 
this scheme would be sufficient in Britain and in France to fund the one-off payments to 
the young as well as the annual pensions to older persons. Some of the finer points of 
Paine’s scheme also show him far ahead of his time: benefits would be paid equally to 
women and men; equally to rich as to the poor; and the scheme should apply to all 
countries. Moreover, in arguing for the inheritance tax, Paine kept it to 10 per cent, 
precisely because he recognized the important contribution that landowners had made in 
raising the productivity of their land, however unjustified the origins of their property. 
Incentives for landowners to continue to improve their land and raise productivity 
would remain.  
 
If such imaginative and daring proposals could be put forward two centuries ago, when 
global inequality was much less and the difficulties of taking action appeared much 
greater, how much more should analysts today be inspired to think afresh. These bold 
and brave early pioneers should be today’s inspiration, not only for analysing inequality 
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